Call for leisure boating drink-drive laws after fatal RIB crash

Legal loopholes that allow people to be drunk in charge of pleasure boats should be closed in the wake of a fatal crash, a report has said.

A Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) report into a double tragedy in Portsmouth Harbour has highlighted a “longstanding regulatory gap” with no enforceable alcohol limits for non-professional mariners.

The report follows an investigation into a high-speed crash on 14 August 2025 when a rigid inflatable boat (RIB) named Peaky Blinder hit a stationary navigation beacon.

The boat’s owner, William Blake, 61, and his friend, passenger Gary Huntington, 60, both lost their lives in the accident. A third man, aged 56, survived with minor injuries.

Fatal collision at five times the harbour speed limit

On 14 August 2025, Peaky Blinder allided with a navigation beacon in Portsmouth Harbour, England, resulting in two fatalities and one minor injury.

The report confirms the accident occurred when Peaky Blinder was returning from a social excursion around various locations in the Solent and Isle of Wight area. Blake was in control of the boat during the trip and alcohol consumption featured centrally throughout the day.

After departing from their final stop at Haslar Marina, Peaky Blinder transited north through Portsmouth Harbour. Acording to the report, once clear of the naval base, As the RIB travelled north through Portsmouth Harbour, Blake accelerated to 49.7 knots – nearly five times the harbour’s strict 10-knot speed limit.

Approaching the channel leading to Port Solent, Peaky Blinder deviated to the starboard side of the channel. During the owner’s attempts to regain the channel, Peaky Blinder struck the navigation beacon at a speed of 33.5 knots. All three occupants were ejected overboard.

After being initially submerged, one passenger surfaced and saw Blake ahead, with the other passenger floating unconscious beyond him next to the stationary Peaky Blinder. As the surviving conscious passenger watched, Blake submerged. He dived to find Blake but was unable to locate him.

On surfacing, the surviving pasenger then swam to Huntington, who was unconscious, and held him alongside the stationary RIB.

A smaller RIB, Tryptic, was traversing the channel at the time and motored to assist.

Huntington was later declared deceased, while Blake’s body was recovered five days later. The remaining passenger survived with minor injuries.

Toxicology and safety failures: the MAIB findings

A toxicology report indicated a significant alcohol concentration in the owner’s blood. The report concluded that the level of alcohol had the potential to substantially impair his judgement, reaction time, and decision-making.

The MAIB noted that those onboard not wearing lifejackets also severely reduced their chances of survival.

Sadly, drink boating incidents are all too common. In September 2025, the MAIB report into a collision between a 7-metre tender and 64-metre motor yacht Isabell Princess of the Sea, resulting in one fatality in Göcek, Turkey, found the individual at the helm to have consumed alcohol above permitted levels.

Recommendations have been made to the Secretary of State for Transport to make an order to commence the provisions on alcohol limits for non-professional mariners and develop legislation to define its scope of application.

According to MAIB, Blake had driven boats recreationally for a number of years and had owned several boats before purchasing Peaky Blinder. He had not completed any formal training in the operation of powerboats but was considered by his friends and family to be a capable coxswain.

At the time of the accident, the owner occupied the jockey seat adjacent to the steering wheel on the starboard side of the cockpit. The sole surviving passenger sat next to the owner on the port side jockey seat, while the passenger who died occupied the jockey seat immediately behind them.

Key safety issues related to RIB accident:

• The vessel was being operated at an unsafe speed immediately before the allision, putting the RIB’s occupants and other water users at risk
• The owner of the vessel was under the influence of alcohol, substantially increasing the likelihood of an accident
• No one on board the vessel was wearing a PFD, which meant they were unavailable to reduce consequences of entering the water
• The system of regulation, enforcement and education in the recreational community were ineffective in influencing on-water behaviours with respect to alcohol consumption.

Calls for tighter drink-boating laws and speed enforcement

The investigation has further recommended to develop a national strategy for the delivery of an effective educational and awareness campaign. The King’s Harbour Master Portsmouth has been recommended to take action to improve adherence to the speed limits in Portsmouth Harbour.

Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents, Rob Loder, says:

“It is well understood that consumption of alcohol results in an elevated risk of having an accident. The introduction of alcohol limits for recreational boaters has been the subject of previous MAIB recommendations. It is to be hoped that action will now be taken, such that fatal accidents in which excessive alcohol consumption is a contributing factor become a thing of the past.”

In 2025, the British Ports Association (BPA) also urged the government to close the longstanding loophole in maritime legislation that allows non-professional mariners to operate vessels while under the influence of alcohol.

Safety onboard commercial RIBs is also under scrutiny, following multiple accidents.

Safety recommendations:

The King’s Harbour Master, Portsmouth has been recommended to:

• Take action to improve adherence to the speed limits contained in the Dockyard Port of Portsmouth Order 2005.

The Secretary of State for Transport has been recommended to:

• Make an order to commence the provisions on alcohol limits for non-professional mariners contained in the Railways and Transport Safety Act, 2003
• Develop and enact proportionate secondary legislation to define the scope of application of subsection 80(3) of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003 using the powers contained in subsection 80(4) of the Act.
• Develop a national strategy for the delivery of an effective educational and awareness campaign.